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A wonderfully apt, succinct characterization of Leigh Hunt appears 
in a recent popular literary history: “Leigh Hunt (1784-1859) was a 
gifted and industrious man of letters, who spent much of his working 
life in the company of men of genius.”1 A better brief estimation would 
be hard to find, but it points to a special problem. How does one write 
about an author whose work was done more than a century ago if that 
writer was not himself a genius? How do you talk about a man of 
considerable talent who, it is asserted, never wrote anything absolutely 
of the first rank but whose work you nevertheless wish to commend? 
In reading the scholarly critical literature on Hunt, again and again one 
finds condemning, or at best apologetic, assessments. “[Hunt’s criticism] 
lacks theoretical power, as his loose derivative theory of the imagination 
shows. He has little judgment. . . . However important as a middleman 
of romantic ideas and tastes, . . .  he lacks real distinction of mind.”2 
“Hunt [employing the critical vocabulary of romanticism] is using these 
terms for the emotional aura that surrounds them, and all precision 
of meaning is lost.”3 “We should acknowledge at the outset . . . that 
Hunt’s intellectual faculties for synthesis were not of the first order 
and that he was not especially interested in theoretical matters.”4 One 
has to sympathize with the scholars who have come to these assessments 
because a fair judgment must discriminate, and in the comparison with 
his great contemporaries, Shelley, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Hazlitt— 
geniuses all—Hunt is left behind. If that is the case, however, why do 
we bother to remember him?
1 Peter Quennell, A History of English Literature (London: Ferndale Editions, 1981), p. 
380.
2 Rene Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950, 4 vols. (New Haven and Lon­
don: Yale University Press, 1955-65), vol. 3: The Age of Transition, p. 125.
5 Stephen F. Fogle, “Leigh Hunt and the End of Romantic Criticism,” in Some British 
Romantics, ed. James V. Logan, John E. Jordan, and Northrop Frye (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1966), p. 128.
4 James R. Thompson, Leigh Hunt (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977), p. 106.
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In saying that Hunt was not a genius in the way that his great contem­
poraries were, I was thinking of Hazlitt’s discussion in the essays “On 
Genius and Common Sense” that appeared in Table Talk (1821).5 If 
we cannot praise Hunt for his genius, we can perhaps praise him for 
his common sense and, by studying the term and his embodiment of 
it, appreciate a quality, important to the romantic critics, that is by 
no means contemptible, nor even always easily achieved. Approaching 
him in this vein, we may approximate the view held by his great contempo­
rary admirers. Shelley, for instance, dedicated The Cenci to Hunt thus: 
“Had I known a person more highly endowed than yourself with all 
that it becomes a man to possess, I had solicited for the work the ornament 
of his name. . . . One of simpler, and, in the highest sense of the word, 
of purer life and manners I never knew.” When a writer as serious 
in his ideals as Shelley speaks this way, saying he uses his words “in 
the highest sense,” we know he doesn’t simply mean that Hunt is a 
pleasant man without notable vulgarities of manner or motive. Hazlitt, 
too, has judicious but high praise for Hunt. In The Spirit o f the Age 
(1825) he notes the faults in Hunt’s writing, which are that “he perhaps 
takes too little pains, and indulges in too much wayward caprice.” But 
he also says, “He is the only poet or literary man we ever knew 
who . . . united rare intellectual acquirements with outward grace and 
natural gentility.” Furthermore “a wit and a poet, Mr. Hunt is also distin­
guished by fineness of tact and sterling sense.”6 Compare this praise 
with a sentence from the first essay “On Genius and Common Sense”: 
“Tact, finesse, is nothing but the being completely aware of the feeling 
belonging to certain situations, passions, &c. and the being consequently 
sensible to their slightest indications or movements in others.”7 Hazlitt 
uses this sentence to introduce his culminating example of the quality 
of common sense, Lord Shaftesbury’s discovery of Anne Hyde’s secret 
marriage to the Duke of York from subtle changes in her mother’s bearing 
toward her. “This,” Hazlitt concludes, “was carrying the prophetic spirit 
of common sense as far as it could go.” If we consider Hazlitt’s remarks 
carefully, it thus seems that something akin to the “prophetic spirit of 
common sense” is one of the “rare intellectual acquirements” he attributes 
to Hunt when praising his “fineness of tact and sterling sense.”
So far as “prophetic spirit” goes, even Hunt’s severest detractors agree 
that he had an uncanny ability to discover and encourage young poetic
5 These essays are conveniently reprinted by John R. Nabholtz, ed., William Hazlitt: 
Selected Essays (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 18-43.
6 William Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age: or Contemporary Portraits, introduced by A. R. 
Waller (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1910, 1955), p. 343.
7 Nabholtz, p. 30.
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talent. Stephen F. Fogle, for instance, recognizing Hunt’s great contribu­
tions to practical criticism, says, “To have brought out in The Examiner, 
one of the most influential papers of the day, the First published work 
of John Keats, and to have used its power to assist both Keats and 
Shelley is an act of prescience from which nothing can detract.”8 Amy 
Lowell earlier created the phrase that subsequent writers have seized 
as the most favorable and least controversial judgment they could make 
concerning Hunt’s critical achievement, though even she feels obliged 
to disclaim any illusions that he was greater than he should be: “Hunt 
was not a great creator certainly, but he was a great introducer. . . .  I 
can never forget that it was his Imagination and Fancy which first taught 
me what poetry was. There is no better text-book for the appreciation 
of poetry than that volume.”9 James B. Misenheimer, Jr. elaborates on 
Lowell’s concept of “introducer,” in a similarly defensive way:
Although his own creative powers were not great, his appreciation 
of creative ability in others was wide and sound. . . . Hunt had an 
almost uncanny power to single out good poets and good works and 
to make independent evaluations that would stand the test of time.10
But when Hazlitt referred to the “prophetic spirit of common sense” 
he surely meant something other than a good record of accurate predic­
tion. Among the liberal romantics of Hunt’s acquaintance, the notion 
of prophecy had a special force. Let us consider Shelley’s use of the 
term in his “Defence of Poetry” which, like Hazlitt’s essay “On Genius 
and Common Sense,” first appeared in the world in 1821, the crucial 
year in which Hunt began his Italian adventure and his renewed hopes 
for the liberal cause.11 Shelley’s discussion of the prophetic spirit, not 
of common sense precisely, but of poetry in general, must have buoyed 
Hunt’s spirits for the task he was undertaking. Shelley optimistically 
describes an inevitable progress in human society and human morality 
led by and expressed by the poets:
[The poets] are not only the authors of language and of music; . . . they 
are the institutors of laws, and founders of civil society, and the inventors
8 Fogle, p. 124.
9 Amy Lowell, John Keats, 2 vols. (New York, 1925), 1:136, quoted by James B. Mis­
enheimer, Jr., in “Leigh Hunt: a 'Great Introducer' in English Romanticism,” Yearbook of 
English Studies, 1 (1971): 135.
10 James B. Misenheimer, Jr., “Leigh Hunt: A ‘Great Introducer’ in English Romanticism,” 
Yearbook of English Studies, 1 (1971): 138.
11 Though Hunt’s arrival in Italy was delayed till 1822, he began serious plans for emigra­
tion in the summer of 1821. In letters of July and August between himself and Shelley, the 
first details of the scheme can be followed: The Correspondence of Leigh Hunt edited by His 
Eldest Son, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1862), 1:163-169. Though Shelley’s “De­
fence of Poetry” was not finally published for several years, Hunt became aware of it about 
this time. Details are given by Bruce R. McElderry, Jr., ed., Shelley's Critical Prose (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 3-4.
 
http://ir.uiowa.edu/bai/vol40/iss1
[44]
of the arts of life, and the teachers, who draw into a certain propinquity 
with the beautiful and the true, that partial apprehension of the agencies 
of the invisible world which is called religion. . . . Poets . . . were called, 
in the earlier epochs of the world, legislators or prophets; a poet essen­
tially comprises and unites both these characters. For he not only beholds 
intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws according to 
which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future 
in the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and fruit 
of latest time.12
The special appeal such a passage would have for Hunt is its sense 
of a powerful sweep of society forward into ever better institutions, 
manners, and enjoyments, precisely the sort of movement that he too 
served as a liberal editor and man of letters. To be associated in this 
kind of constructive activity with two of the most powerful poets of 
his time was the purpose of his emigration to Italy.
Because Leigh Hunt’s knowledge of Shelley’s and Hazlitt’s theoretical 
essays was so close and so basic to his own critical attitudes, some 
further attention to the details of their thought will help place Hunt's 
contribution to romantic criticism in its proper frame. In Shelley’s “De­
fence of Poetry,” “imagination”—that workhorse term of romanticism— 
refers to a class of mental actions that compose from individual thoughts, 
“as from elements,” other more complex thoughts which are synthesized 
integrities or unities. Poetry is defined as “the expression of the imagina­
tion” or, in other words, as the creation or synthesis of these unities. 
Furthermore, “poetry is connate with the origin of man,” because to 
be human means to engage in the process of perceiving or constructing 
these unities. In a lyrical but completely empirical formulation that John 
Locke would not have disagreed with, Shelley states, “Man is an instru­
ment over which a series of external and internal impressions are driven.” 
This experiential process is delightful, and the child or the primitive 
man will try to express in voice and gesture both its delight and its 
shaping of these impressions into the most comprehensive unities possi­
ble. And indeed as the experiential impressions fade, he will try to prolong 
them by those expressions he has associated with them. These expressions 
constitute the products and history of the poetic or synthesizing spirit. 
At the earliest stages man delights in the external world; then comes 
self-consciousness, social consciousness, and finally civilized societal 
awareness. At each stage imagination strives to create those unified ex­
pressions of experience that assure the keenest delight: “For there is 
a certain order or rhythm belonging to each of these classes of mimetic 
representation from which the hearer and the spectator receive an intenser
12 Bruce R. McElderry, Jr., ed., Shelley’s Critical Prose (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1967), p. 7.
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and purer pleasure than from any other: the sense of an approximation 
to this order has been called taste by modern writers.” (Hazlitt, we 
have seen, had used the word taste, or its synonyms tact and finesse, 
in his description of Hunt.)
In the earliest stages of human development, Shelley continues, every 
individual can express this order well. Shelley rather cumbersomely calls 
this power of expression the “faculty of approximation to the beautiful.” 
As time goes on some persons are recognized to possess the faculty 
to a much higher degree than others, and to them is granted the specialized 
task of expressing the fundamental human order most fully so that “the 
pleasure resulting from the manner in which they express the influence 
of society or nature upon their own minds, communicates itself to others, 
and gathers a sort of reduplication from that community.” The poets, 
in other words, are those who express the truest vision of humanity—the 
most comprehensively integrated and the most accordant with “pleasure.” 
And this vision the rest of society receives and assimilates to itself. Thus 
it is that the poets, “who imagine and express this indestructible order,” 
become the institutors, the founders, the teachers, and the prophets.13 
For Shelley, then, the poets are practical people of thought and action 
leading forward the evolutionary march of human knowledge and institu­
tions. And when we are looking for sources of Leigh Hunt’s literary 
principles we might remember this essay. Shelley, a true genius, provided 
a coherent, rational structuring of literary principles, including answers 
to those questions that occupied several of the greater romantic writers: 
what is a poet? and what does a poet do? And to this structure, in 
part, Leigh Hunt, a man of taste and common sense, assimilated his 
own thought. If we accept this view of the matter, we can get a little 
closer to understanding what quality Hunt possessed that enabled him 
to be the great discoverer, nurturer, and introducer of literary genius 
to his age. Remember again Shelley’s remark: “There is a certain order 
or rhythm belonging to each of these classes of mimetic representation, 
from which the hearer and spectator receive an intenser and purer plea­
sure than from any other: the sense of an approximation to this order 
has been called taste by modern writers.”
Let us turn now to the essay by Hunt’s other great critical friend, 
who commended him for his “fineness of tact and sterling sense.” Begin 
again with the passage from “On Genius and Common Sense” quoted 
earlier. “Tact, finesse, is nothing but the being completely aware of 
the feeling belonging to certain situations, passions, &c. and the being 
consequently sensible to their slightest indications or movements in
13 Ibid., pp. 4-7.
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others.”14 Just as Shelley did, Hazlitt bases his model of human experience 
and thought in “feeling,” or what the British empirical philosophers 
called impression. He says, “In art, in taste, in life, in speech, you decide 
from feeling, and not from reason; that is, from the impression of a 
number of things on the mind, which impression is true and well-founded 
though you may not be able to analyse or account for it in the several 
particulars” [my emphasis], A little further on he calls these impressions 
“the immediate stamp of nature.” The single or unified impression that 
results from “the impression of a number of things” clearly involves 
a synthesis of many elements into an integrated experience which includes 
a power to respond, express, or, as he says, “judge.” Hazlitt elaborates 
more fully upon the power of judgment and expression at the level of 
ordinary experience, the level he calls “common sense.” “Common sense 
is the just result of the sum-total of such unconscious impressions in 
the ordinary occurrences of life, as they are treasured up in the memory, 
and called out by the occasion. Genius and taste depend upon much 
the same principle exercised on loftier ground and in more unusual 
combinations.”15
“Common sense” for Hazlitt is a powerful and firm guide to action. 
It is the “just result” of “the sum-total” of the unconscious impressions 
that constitute experience. Common sense, then, is accurate human feel­
ing, directly representative of a pure humanity uncontaminated by prej­
udice, false refinement, or vulgar opinion. It is easily tainted, but in 
persons of genuine tact or finesse it can function as “the prophetic spirit 
of common sense.” And it is on the basis of this common sense that 
loftier acts of genius or taste occur. Hunt stood between Hazlitt and 
Shelley, these literary men of genius, highly regarded by both for powers 
of taste and judgment, remarkable because grounded in a pure and honest 
common sense. As a critic, editor, and representer of ideals they believed 
in, according to their own testimony, these men found none more capable 
of understanding and supporting them—and their genius—than Leigh 
Hunt.
To follow this last point a little further, let us consider Hazlitt’s other 
term. If Hunt is exemplary of common sense, fineness of tact, indeed 
“sterling” sense, what is it that sets “genius” apart? Hazlitt says the 
man of real genius “has the feeling of truth already shrined in his own 
breast, and his eye is still bent on nature to see how she expresses 
herself.”16 Based on his own self-awareness, his own experience of the 
fundamental human order, the man of genius looks for accordant expres­
14 Nabholtz, p. 30.
15 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
16 Ibid., p. 29.
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sions on the part of nature herself. But the man of common sense does 
this too, does he not? How else could he regard her but in the light 
of his fundamental interpretive finesse or tact unless it be with something 
less appropriate, like prejudice or vanity? The difference, then, is that 
the man of genius creates new relationships with nature which common 
sense never realized before. “Genius or originality is, for the most part, 
some strong quality in the mind, answering to and bringing out some 
new and striking quality in nature [Hazlitt’s emphasis].”17 Apparently 
the “prophetic spirit” of common sense in some persons of extreme 
capacity, which sets them over into a new category of intellect, can 
enter or realize uncharted territories of internal or external nature and 
thus open them more fully to experience. What genius discovers, once 
revealed, is available to all persons of common sense. Those persons, 
however, do not merely passively receive what genius has given them. 
Rather they themselves, having been shown the way, must positively 
reenact the discovery, extending by imagination their own stores of pas­
sion or feeling into the revealed area of experience.
The creations of imagination, syntheses of various impressions, or­
ganize themselves for Hazlitt around particular strong passions, not ac­
cording to structured forms: “[In acts of association] any impression 
in a series can recall any other impression in that series without going 
through the whole in order: so that the mind drops the intermediate 
links, and passes on rapidly and by stealth to the more striking effects 
of pleasure or pain which have naturally taken the strongest hold of 
it.”18 The organizing nodes of mental syntheses, in Hazlitt’s view, are 
not rational, esthetic, or logical arrangements and structures of impres­
sions, but rather strong predominating passions, elemental in force, to 
which all other impressions are drawn, as to a magnet.
A key point to be observed in Hazlitt’s critical theory is that imagination 
belongs as well to the person of common sense, the person of taste, 
and the person of genius. Imagination, based on feeling, responsive to 
external and internal impressions according to the modes of a fundamen­
tal human order of experience, is the power that communicates between 
them. And the fact that imagination operates throughout the scale of 
cognition from the just-awakening common sense to the loftiest genius 
means that a common instrument for expression or communication exists 
whereby the discoveries of genius can be assimilated into the community 
at large; and, thus, the liberal march of progress is effected. If the geniuses 
are the innovators and leaders of moral, cultural, or artistic reform, 
persons of reliable common sense are needed to consolidate and establish
17 Ibid., p. 31.
18 Ibid., p. 22.
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the reformation. Shelley recognized in Leigh Hunt such a person and 
invited him to Italy on that basis.19
This essay has devoted considerable space to reviewing fundamental 
critical principles expressed by two romantic creators who were closest 
to Hunt during, probably, the most crucial year of his life. One reason 
to conduct such a review, is that Hunt’s intelligence and critical reputation 
have been attacked by influential scholars who have not considered the 
relevant context, but instead have denigrated his work because it has 
not explicated Coleridge. In fact, the primary elements in Hunt's critical 
principles owe far more to Hazlitt and Shelley, whom he assimilated 
and represented to the general reading public. A second reason for review­
ing Shelley and Hazlitt, especially the latter, is that they define a process, 
as it were a social program of art at its highest levels of influence over 
the progressive tendencies of humankind, which explains precisely what 
Hunt’s position and what his work amounted to in the romantic scheme 
of things. Hazlitt’s depiction of genius and common sense provides the 
clearest model of what we may assume Hunt’s relation to his greater 
contemporaries to be. It is a model which explains in more detail and 
gives significant depth to the character Amy Lowell gave us of Hunt 
as “a great introducer.” Hunt had a power of taste, in the high sense 
defined by Shelley and Hazlitt, that was effective in its own time and 
can still instruct in its own right, and complete our awareness of that 
splendid age of literary art.20 Let us consider an example.
Before turning to one of Hunt’s best pieces of practical criticism, 
let us address Hazlitt’s mild censure of his writing in The Spirit o f the 
Age: “he perhaps takes too little pains, and indulges in too much wayward 
caprice.” This applies to much of Hunt’s vast production as a literary 
journalist, and it has been made the occasion for critical abuse and 
ridicule. But we need to focus on his best work, as we do for the greater 
geniuses of his age. A “balanced” judgment of Wordsworth would reveal 
that the volume of his mediocre verse exceeds that of his irreplaceable
19 An excellent full picture of Hunt’s relation to Shelley as co-worker in the liberal cause 
is the selection from both authors’ publications and correspondence, edited and discussed 
by R. Brimley Johnson, Shelley-Leigh Hunt: How Friendship Made History: Extending the 
Bounds of Human Freedom and Thought (New York: Haskell House, 1972—reprint of 1929 
edition).
20 Corroborating evidence of the need felt among the romantics for cultivating and en­
lightening public taste to the new literature is in Wordsworth’s “Essay, Supplementary to 
the Preface” (1815), which Hunt surely knew. “If there be one conclusion more forcibly 
pressed upon us than another by the review which has just been given of the fortunes and 
fate of poetical Works, it is this,—that every author, as far as he is great and at the same 
time original, has had the task of creating the taste by which he is to be enjoyed: so has it 
been, so will it continue to be.” William Wordsworth: Selected Poems and Prefaces, ed. Jack 
Stillinger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 477. Like all the greater poets of his day, 
Wordsworth thought himself ill-served by criticism in the major literary reviews.
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poetry by a considerable margin. And the same proportion would exist 
for Byron and many other writers. Indeed Hunt himself remarks on 
this general fact in his discussion of Middleton, Dekker, and Webster 
in Imagination and Fancy (1844): “When about to speak of these and 
other extraordinary men of the days of Shakespeare . . .  I wasted a good 
deal of time in trying to find out how it was that, possessing, as most 
of them did, such a pure vein of poetry . . . they wrote so much that 
is not worth reading, sometimes not fit to be read. I might have considered 
that, either from self-love, or necessity, or both, too much writing is 
the fault of all ages and of every author.”21 This is not the only place 
in Hunt’s writings where he intimates a shortcoming of his own in this 
regard. But there are many examples where the trenchancy of his style 
and the vigor of his common sense combine with delightful effect.
The example we turn to, recalling Hazlitt’s distinction between com­
mon sense and vulgar opinion, is Hunt’s defense of the unconventional 
genius of Byron's Don Juan against its canting, hypocritically moral 
detractors. In The Examiner of October 31, 1819, he writes, “Don Juan 
is accused of being an ‘immoral’ work, which we cannot discover.” He 
describes the situation in Canto I leading to the mutual seduction of 
Juan and Julia. “This, it is said, has tendency to corrupt the minds of 
'us youth,’ and to make us think lightly of breaking the matrimonial 
contract. But if to do this be immoral, we can only say that Nature 
is immoral.” He goes on, “Lord Byron does no more than relate the 
consequences of certain absurdities. If he speaks slightingly of the ties 
between a girl and a husband old enough for her father, it is because 
the ties themselves are slight. He does not ridicule the bonds of Marriage 
generally, or where they are formed as they should be: he merely shows 
the folly and wickedness of setting forms and opinions against nature.” 
Clearly Hunt is speaking with the insight of unblemished common sense, 
as Hazlitt discussed it, and from this base is opening to his readers 
the opportunity to respond justly to the work against the conventionally 
antisexual morality that was already forming this early in the nineteenth 
century. In fact, with a clearheaded awareness of powerful forces within 
human nature that William Blake would not have disdained, Hunt wittily 
attacks the moralists straight on.
There are a set of prudish and very suspicious moralists who endeavor 
to make vice appear to inexperienced eyes much more hateful than 
it really is. They would correct Nature;—and they always overreach 
themselves. . . . Now the said prudes . . . are constantly declaiming on 
the deformity of vice, and its almost total want of attraction. The conse­
quence is, that when they are found to have deceived (as they always
21 Leigh Hunt, Imagination and Fancy (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1848), p. 158.
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are) and immoral indulgence is discovered to be not without its 
charms,—the minds of young persons are apt to confound their true 
with their false maxims.
Because Hunt’s stand here—for common sense and for human nature— 
links him with several of the great geniuses of his age, notably Shelley 
and William Blake as well as Byron, it is worth quoting a little further 
from this review. Lacking an independent income, having many children 
to feed, entirely dependent on an accepting public for his maintenance, 
Hunt shows courageous fidelity to the standards of common sense as 
well as a keen, “prescient” anticipation of the long-running history and 
resolution of this issue. Discussing Canto II, Hunt says,
We suppose there has been some sermonizing on the description of 
the delight arising from the “illicit intercourse" of Juan and Haidee. 
People who talk in this way can perceive no distinctions.
He goes on to describe briefly the circumstance of those lovers, removed 
from the artificial constraints of society. Then,
But what is there to blame in a beautiful and affectionate girl who 
gives way to a passion for a young shipwrecked human creature bound 
to her by gratitude as well as love? . . . Does she not receive, as well 
as bestow, more real pleasure (for that is the question) in the enjoyment 
of a first and deep passion, than in becoming the wife of some brother 
in iniquity to whom her pirating father would have trucked her for 
lucre?
The ironic cadences of that last sentence cut to the bone, not merely 
as wit but as incisive criticism of social sickness in his age. Hunt interprets 
Byron more deeply perhaps than Byron intended. In a sense, Hunt extends 
Byron’s poem to a level of application that the apparent levity and flip­
pancy of Byron’s tone might not otherwise reach with the general reader. 
Hunt reveals in Byron that which Byron’s tone might have concealed. 
Finally, the concluding paragraph of Hunt’s review is surely an example 
of tact and finesse yielding “the prophetic spirit of common sense.” 
It is short, but to students of romanticism it cannot but suggest the 
struggles of Los with Vala in The Four Zoas or of Los with his Spectre 
in Jerusalem, which Blake was working out at the very time Hunt was 
writing. Here is the paragraph.
The fact is, at the bottom of all these questions, that many things 
are made vicious, which are not so by nature; and many things made 
virtuous, which are only so by calling and agreement: and it is on 
the horns of this self-created dilemma, that society is continually writh­
ing and getting desperate.22
22 Leigh Hunt, “On Byron’s Don Juan: Cantos First and Second," The Examiner 618 (Oct. 
31, 1819); reprinted in Anthology of Romanticism, ed. Ernest Bernbaum (New York: The 
Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 1003-05.
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For another exhibit of Leigh Hunt’s role as romantic critic, let us 
turn to his only extended effort at theoretical exposition, the essay “What 
Is Poetry?” which opens the 1844 volume Imagination and Fancy. This 
essay has been most severely—and strangely—denigrated by scholars 
in the past quarter century. The negative estimates concerning Hunt’s 
intelligence and critical achievement quoted at the beginning of this 
discussion are directed mainly at the 1844 essay. The essay has received 
more mockery than sympathetic reading in recent years. Ernest Bernbaum 
in 1929 called it “one of the clearest and most comprehensive, though 
not the profoundest, treatment of the subject by any of the Romantics.”23 
But M. H. Abrams wittily set the tone for contemporary reception of 
the essay by reminding his readers of a critical joke made at Hunt’s 
expense in the previous century. After summarizing differences between 
Coleridge, Hazlitt, Shelley, and Byron in the definition of poetry, Abrams 
quips, “Finally Leigh Hunt reconciled these differences by the simple 
device of a definition which, as David Masson has remarked, is ‘con­
structed on the principle of omitting nothing that anyone would like 
to see included’.”24
It seems to have been the elaborateness of Hunt’s opening definition 
that has led his detractors to deny him judgment or distinction of mind. 
Yet it seems to me that if one reads his opening paragraph, keeping 
in mind the relevant background of Hazlitt, Shelley, and the other great 
critical geniuses of the era, one may well be enlightened, pleased, and 
indeed impressed by the distinguished qualities of mind revealed. Hunt 
gives an imaginatively integrated account of romantic poetic theory that 
begins with a lucid, tightly structured outline, that is developed with 
clarity and cogency, and that ends with a fruitful juxtaposition of passages 
from Milton, Coleridge, and Shelley, which resonate with new significance 
in the context he has prepared for them. Perhaps by 1844 the principles 
expressed are no longer revolutionary. But neither are Hunt’s intentions 
revolutionary. They are, rather, “to furnish such an account, in an essay, 
of the nature and requirements of poetry, as may enable readers in 
general to give an answer on those points to themselves and others” 
[Hunt’s emphasis].25
Turning to the essay, one discovers that Masson’s and Abrams’s word 
is not precisely accurate. The paragraph in question is not a “definition” 
according to the meaning by which one expects a man of abstract thought
23 Bernbaum, p. 1216. The first edition of his anthology appeared in 1929.
24 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1958), p. 49. Abrams is quoting David Masson, Wordsworth, 
Shelley, Keats and Other Essays (London, 1874).
25 Imagination and Fancy, p. viii.
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to summarize a topic or concept broadly and memorably in a short 
pithy expression. Rather, Hunt's paragraph is an announcement and 
outline of the aspects of his subject to be covered at length in the essay, 
all brought together in a connected, if full, statement of his intent (current 
academic rhetoricians call such a passage occurring at the beginning 
of an essay the thesis statement). Indeed Hunt’s 1844 essay might seem 
to lack the lightning flashes of genius used by the romantic essayists, 
but Hunt’s procedure ably organizes for the wider, though educated 
Victorian reading public the complex theories of the romantic innovators.
Here is the opening statement of “What Is Poetry?”
Poetry, strictly and artistically so called, that is to say, considered not 
merely as poetic feeling, which is more or less shared by all the world, 
but as the operation of that feeling such as we see it in the poet’s 
book, is the utterance of a passion for truth, beauty, and power, embody­
ing and illustrating its conceptions by imagination and fancy, and mod­
ulating its language on the principle of variety in uniformity. Its means 
are whatever the universe contains; and its end, pleasure and exaltation. 
Poetry stands between nature and convention, keeping alive among 
us the enjoyment of the external and spiritual world: it has constituted 
the most enduring fame of nations; and next to Love and Beauty, which 
are its parents, is the greatest proof to man of the pleasure to be found 
in all things, and of the probable riches of infinitude.
Every point that Hunt develops in the 46 pages of his essay is touched 
on in this outline, and the transitions he will develop in full are intimated. 
Each of the topics can be paralleled in an important precursor essay 
by Wordsworth, Coleridge, Hazlitt, Shelley, or others, but Hunt richly 
illustrates each and treats it with his own taste and good sense. Notice 
the opening distinction between poetry as the actual expressions in the 
poet’s book and a more general poetic feeling “which is more or less 
shared by all the world.” This has been regarded by Stephen F. Fogle, 
among others, as so much soft and meaningless verbiage padding out 
an already overblown statement.27 Although “general poetic feeling” is 
a concept easily and often sentimentalized, Hunt is making an important 
point here, one already commented on in relation to Shelley’s “Defence 
of Poetry.” Hunt wishes to insist that what the poets express in their
26 Ibid., p. 2.
27 Stephen F. Fogle’s essay, noted earlier, mocks nearly every phrase in this outline. Fogle 
misses the fact that it is an outline rather than a definition, and thus is led into an unsym­
pathetic reading of each phrase without, apparently, awareness of its context. He says, “The 
very piling up of terms in this passage has worn them threadbare. That they are all set down 
here together, that it is this cluster of words rather than another, is proof that something 
has happened in the world of criticism since 1800" (p. 131). Something has happened, to 
be sure, something positive. The ideas have made their way into the world of common sense, 
perhaps with their edges softened but not with their shapes deformed, at least not in Hunt’s 
essay as it is subsequently developed. Rene Wellek, whose damning estimate of Hunt’s intel­
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books is not foreign, alien, effeminate, or imaginary.28 Rather, poets 
express a fundamental human order shared by all members of the species, 
an order expressible with greatest comprehensiveness and pleasurable­
ness by the best poets in their achievements of greatest truth and beauty.
The concepts of truth and beauty, as well as two others equally impor­
tant to Hazlitt and Shelley, are referred to then in the section of Hunt’s 
outline that might properly be singled out as the “definition.” The more 
limited “definition” reads “Poetry . . .  is the utterance of a passion for 
truth, beauty, and power.” Each of these key terms receives further 
elaboration.
—“Poetry is a passion, because it seeks the deepest impressions; and 
because it must undergo, in order to convey them.” The poet must feel, 
and feel deeply, the myriad impressions that nature and his own responses 
play across his sensibility. He must willingly undergo these feelings if 
he is genuinely to register and thus be able to express truly the fundamen­
tal human order.
—“It is a passion for truth, because without truth the impression would 
be false or defective.” “Truth” here means an accurate registration of 
the realities of nature. In Hazlitt’s terminology it would involve the dis­
tinction between common sense and vulgar opinion. The passion for 
truth, for instance, is what Hunt showed to be operative in Byron’s 
attack on hypocritical moralities in his review of Don Juan.
—“It is a passion for beauty, because its office is to exalt and refine 
by means of pleasure, and because beauty is nothing but the loveliest 
form of pleasure.” Hunt is referring here to Shelley’s notion of beauty 
as the degree of expression approximating most closely to the fundamental 
order or rhythm of experience from which, accordingly, the purest and 
most intense degree of pleasure ensues. Thus he calls it the “loveliest,” 
meaning the most desirable, the most pleasing form of pleasure. It must 
be remembered also that, in his time, Hunt would need to distinguish 
by some such adjective the pleasure he is discussing because of the
ligence (noted earlier) shares Fogle’s unsympathetic mocking approach, also seems to ignore 
the larger structure and interrelated coherence of Hunt’s essay. Neither critic recognizes that 
the essay belongs to the new Victorian genre, the “organized," unified, tightly structured, 
serious prose essay. Here are not the rambling, intuitively guided series of observations that 
appear in Hazlitt's writing, for instance, but a consciously structured meditation enjoying 
intellectual coherence and rational orderliness. It is indeed of the Victorian age of consolida­
tion and not of the bounds-breaking, revolutionary, expansive fervor of the century’s earlier 
decades. But Fogle and Wellek are wrong to see the essay as muddle-headed or degenerate.
28 Contrast Hunt’s desire with Matthew Arnold’s summarizing characterization of Shelley 
many years later as “A beautiful and ineffectual angel beating in the void his luminous wings 
in vain" (Essays in Criticism, 1888). Arnold’s phrase is very amusing and eternally memora­
ble, but it also did a good deal of damage to the reputation of poetry among the middle class 
reading public that Hunt is reaching out to in his essay.
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Benthamite Utilitarian scheme to reduce all pleasures to the same qualita­
tive level.
—Finally, “It is a passion for power, because power is impression trium­
phant, whether over the poet, as desired by himself, or over the reader, 
as affected by the poet.” Only by feeling deeply, by “ardent subjections 
of one’s self to emotion” can one realize the pleasure, the beauty, the 
truth, and so on. In a way this axiom repeats the earlier three, but 
by stating it in this form, Hunt is able to recall Hazlitt’s doctrine that 
the synthesis or ordering of experience, poetry triumphant, occurs across 
the nodes of most intense feeling or impression.
These few passages, I believe, illustrate how vividly Hunt’s essay picks 
up and redeploys the concepts of his great precursors. One or two further 
comments must suffice for this demonstration. Hunt’s discussion of imag­
ination and fancy has been much discussed by Wellek, Fogle, Thompson, 
and others, who do or do not believe he knew what he was talking 
about. Those who think he did not know insist that he was trying to 
explain Coleridge but could not. I would simply agree with James R. 
Thompson that in the distinction he makes between the two terms, “It 
is more likely . . . that Hunt’s reference is to the preface of Wordsworth’s 
1815 edition in which he attempts to justify his classifications”29 than 
it is to Biographia Literaria, especially the fragmentary remarks of chapter 
13. To me, Hunt’s discussion of imagination and fancy is sufficiently 
compatible with Wordsworth’s to demonstrate a reasoned and intelligent 
position on his part rather than the dim-witted pretense at understanding 
implied by Wellek.
One further example: Fogle is remarkably disturbed by Hunt’s mention 
of love and beauty in the final clause of his outline. Fogle writes, “To 
make Poetry the child of Love and Beauty . . .  is to create a family group 
that defies analysis. . . . One would like to ask what the exact qualities 
of Love and Beauty are that are reproduced in their child Poetry.”30 
The answer to Fogle is rather simple. Hunt has claimed that poetry 
“is the greatest proof to man of the pleasure to be found in all things, 
and of the probable riches of infinitude.” This is easy enough to interpret 
in the light of poetry’s relation to the fundamental order of experience 
between man and nature. Maybe the phrase “probable riches of in­
finitude” refers to transcendent implications, like Wordsworth’s “Intima­
tions of Immortality”; but that need not concern us for the present. 
Hunt also says, however, that two qualities, love and beauty, are even 
greater proofs of these felicities than poetry is, and furthermore, it is
29 Thompson, p. 108.
30 Fogle, pp. 131-2.
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apparently these greater qualities that by their conjunction give birth 
to poetry. This is the assertion that has confused.
The discussion so far concerning the meaning of “Beauty” for Hunt 
and Shelley explains how she might be called the giver of felicity and 
the mother of poetry. But how does “Love” enter the picture? Realizing 
that we are reading the last clause of Hunt’s topical outline for his 
essay, if we turn to the last topic developed, we find another quotation 
from Shelley’s “Defence of Poetry,” wherein the bridegroom appeareth.31 
The first part of the quoted passage alludes again to the progressive 
recovery of the beauty of existence through poetic expressions which 
use external nature to reveal the exalted humanity of our interior spirit: 
poetry represents or “impersonates” objects, which then stand as “memo­
rials of that gentle and exalted content”—human feeling and human 
being—“which extends itself over all thoughts and actions with which 
it co-exists.” It is also notable that this part of Shelley’s paragraph de­
scribes the activity of the poet himself, the maker of the book proper 
which Hunt distinguished in the opening phrases of his essay. Reading 
on into the second half of the quoted passage, we see that “Love” is 
the new concept introduced. Additionally, it becomes apparent by the 
last sentence of the passage that the perspective has shifted away from 
the poet who makes the book to the reader of the book, the receiver 
of the effects of poetry, which are explicitly stated in this instance to 
be moral in character. In commenting on his choice of this passage, 
Hunt calls it a “peroration.” As a good Latinist Hunt would know that 
the basic meaning of the word is not simply a fancy passage of prose, 
but the concluding rhetorical summation of the primary point of a dis­
course. But in fact the passage is not, in Shelley’s “Defence,” the perora­
tion. It comes from the early middle of the essay and is merely one 
among a number of parallel ideas. But the passage is Hunt’s peroration. 
By his selection and placement of Shelley’s paragraph, he makes it the 
rhetorical conclusion of his own essay. He assimilates his thought to 
it and ties conclusively together the various threads of his critical exposi­
tion.
Here is the second part of the passage.
The great secret of morals is love, or a going out of our own nature, 
and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in 
thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good, 
must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in 
the place of another, and of many others: the pains and pleasures 
of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral
31 Imagination and Fancy, p. 47. McElderry, pp. 12-13. The passage quoted begins with 
the words “Poetry lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world. . . .”
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good is imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting 
upon the cause.
Though Shelley’s expression of his critical genius is compact and intense, 
it can be explicated simply enough. Love, he says, is a going out from 
our own selfish nature to an identification of ourselves with the beautiful, 
which, as we know by now, is the most intense and comprehensive 
realization of the fundamental order. The instrument of this going out 
and identification is the imagination, or that capacity of the mind whereby 
“true” and “beautiful” syntheses of our impressions are achieved. At 
first, poetry expresses the imagination of the poet, the man of genius; 
but, equally important, once expressed by genius, the poetry affects the 
imagination of the man of common sense, causing his basic humanity 
to go beyond its personal embodiment to awareness of unity—identifica­
tion—with the universal order of humanity.
Hunt has chosen a complex passage from Shelley to stand as his summa­
tion, but his choice reveals deep critical insight and an editor’s keen 
skill as he incorporates the passage and its reverberations with his own 
ideas. The dual perspective of the paragraph as it shifts from poet to 
reader reenacts the passage of insight from genius to common sense. 
In the first half of the passage the poet extends his own humanity, his 
own sense of fundamental order, out to nature to represent or “imperso­
nate” it and make it partake of this order. Then, as described in the 
second half of the passage, the reader recognizes his own deepest self 
in this impersonation of nature and other beings. Thus not only is that 
deepest self evoked, but it is also extended into imaginative identifica­
tion—love—with the order (the beautiful) in persons not himself. Because 
of this identification—at the deepest level of common humanity—benevo­
lence, goodwill, tolerance, and so forth, the profoundest acts of moral 
good are brought about. Poetry achieves this end by acting upon the 
cause of this end, which is, simply, the imaginative perception of beauty 
or fundamental order.
There is another sense of the word love evoked in Hunt’s quotation 
from Shelley that goes beyond the ideal of imaginative identification 
with the fundamental order of beauty. In distinguishing between beauty 
and love, Hunt overleaps the kind of dangerous aestheticism or solipsistic 
indulgence which might rest satisfied in a “Palace of Art” (a topic written 
on by Tennyson in his poem of that name first published in 1832 and 
in revised form in 1842, respectively twelve and two years before Hunt’s 
essay appeared). Hunt emphasizes instead the active progression in 
knowledge and being that accords with his liberal social hopes for man­
kind. The two words depict a staged response to perception of the funda­
mental human order. The first stage is simply the most comprehensive 
and pleasurable apprehension of this order, experienced as beauty. The
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second stage, however, is the sense of this beauty made self-conscious 
and active. This is the stage called love. Relatively speaking, beauty 
might be experienced in a passive or receptive mode of pure delight—a 
passion and hence a power, but a quiescent, inwardly absorbed one, 
perhaps not even fully cognizant. But love, more self-conscious and 
explicitly active in its association with moral good, as Shelley’s passage 
stipulates, unites itself with the quieter state. And the union of quiescent 
receptive power with active outgoing power, both emanating from percep­
tion of the fundamental human order, results in a new birth of expression, 
a new utterance of the fundamental order—or a new utterance of power, 
passion, truth, and beauty, which we recall was Hunt’s basic definition 
of poetry. Keeping in mind the dual aspect of imagination that Hunt 
evoked by selecting this particular passage from Shelley’s essay, involving 
both the reader of the poem and its maker, let us note that the utterance 
or expression of the reader will be active and moral whereas the utterance 
of the poet proper will be cognitive and verbal. It is in this rich sense 
that Hunt refers to poetry as the child of love and beauty.
Hunt’s formulation, then, is another redeployment of the powerful 
romantic concepts concerning poetry, art, and social responsibility 
created by his great precursors. His is not so complex as their fuller 
analyses, but neither does it merely mimic, nor does it distort in its 
greater simplicity. His remarks resonate with theirs. Is this resonance 
absolutely essential to our understanding of romantic literary theory? 
Rationally, perhaps it is not. But romantic literary theory emphasizes 
other qualities than the coldly rational. It cares for pleasure, taste, and 
passion, too. And the pleasure of knowing Leigh Hunt at his best and 
appreciating his intelligence, his taste, and his passion for literature, 
just as his great contemporaries knew and appreciated it, is available 
to us still in his finer work. It is integral to the even richer pleasure 
of knowing the era we recall as the romantic age of genius and common 
sense.
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